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More on Mortgage Transfer Mysteries 
Roger Bernhardt 
Introduction 
Predatory mortgage lending issues appear to have died down momentarily, at least as far 
as reported state and federal appellate litigation indicates, but questions about the 
transfers of those mortgages in the secondary market seem to be growing markedly. 
Three issues ago, I wrote on Aceves v U.S. Bank (2011) 192 CA4th 218, 120 CR3d 507, 
where one of the issues was whether the new trustee had been properly substituted in by 
the new lender. See Mixed Messages on Mortgage Foreclosures, 34 CEB RPLR 54 (Mar. 
2011). Then, two issues ago, I covered Gomes v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 
192 CA4th 1149, 121 CR3d 819, which held that our statutory provisions permitting 
trustee sales to be conducted by “any authorized agent” of the beneficiary eliminate most 
debtor challenges as to how the loan documents got to the foreclosing party. See 
Challenges to California Foreclosures Based on MERS Transfers, 34 CEB RPLR 87 
(May 2011). Then, last issue, I commented on Ferguson v Avelo Mortgage, LLC (2011) 
195 CA4th 1618, 126 CR3d 586, which—indirectly—upheld the effectiveness of a 
transfer through MERS although it involved only the deed of trust and not the note. See 
The Editor’s Take, 34 CEB RPLR 143 (July 2011). Now, in this issue, there are three 
more cases involving those issues. What keeps the topic from being monotonous is that 
the rulings are always new and different—and often scary. 
Herrera v Deutsche Bank: Proving a Chain of Loan Titles 
In the first of the decisions rendered in this period—Herrera v Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 
Co. (2011) 196 CA4th 1366, 127 CR3d 362, reported on p 169—the Third District sets a 
high bar that a lender must clear when it is not the original holder of the loan it is 
foreclosing. The original beneficiary of a 2003 deed of trust in that case was Long Beach 
Mortgage, followed by its successor, Washington Mutual Bank, then its successor, 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, and then, finally, Deutsche Bank. Because there seemed to be no 
real argument that the underlying debt was not in default and that formally correct trustee 
sale proceedings had been conducted, the chain of title to the loan was the only issue 
holding up a summary judgment in favor of the defendant lender in the trustors’ action to 
set aside the sale. The holding was that the lender’s production of a 2009 recorded 
assignment of the deed of trust by JPMorgan to Deutsche and a same-day recorded 
substitution of trustee by Deutsche was not enough to establish proper authority to 
conduct a trustee sale, even when bolstered by a declaration of an officer of the new 
trustee that money was still owing on the loan. 
I am no evidence expert, but it seems obvious even to me that when there have been 
transfers from X to Y and then to Z, neither a copy of the Y to Z document nor a 
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declaration by an employee of Z would constitute satisfactory proof about the X to Y part 
of the transaction. If that is all that the case holds, then its impact is probably limited and 
surmountable. Foreclosing lenders need merely produce a complete chain of title, rather 
than a few links of it, when being challenged by their borrowers. That is, while the record 
of the Y to Z assignment might not be acceptable as proof of a transfer from X to Y, it 
would sufficiently evidence the Y to Z transfer, so that supplementing it with a recorded 
X to Y assignment would complete the necessary chain (assuming that the problem of an 
internal MERS transfer is also finessed). 
On the other hand, if this decision means—as some bankruptcy courts have suggested—
that duly qualified officers from each institution in the process will have to appear in 
court to swear under oath that they actually and validly did assign their mortgage 
documents to the next party in line, then the secondary market is in for a long and 
uncertain time, considering how many of those lending institutions no longer exist. The 
forgiving standards employed by the First and Second Districts in Gomes and Aceves 
may not fare as well in the harsher climate of the Third District, if that is really what the 
court was saying. 
In re Veal: Proving That This Lender Really Is the End of the Line 
The second decision, Veal v American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal) (BAP 
9th Cir 2011) 450 BR 897, reported on p 169, moves one step later in the loan transfer 
process: Even if a complete chain of title was established, is this beneficiary or trustee 
really the one at the end of the line, i.e., the one entitled to collect or foreclose on the 
loan? The original beneficiary in Veal was GSF, who assigned the mortgage to Option 
One, who assigned it to Wells Fargo Bank (Wells), as trustee for a securitized trust. 
When Veal filed a Chapter 13 petition, Wells sought stay relief to foreclose, while its 
mortgage trustee, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (AMHSI), filed a proof of 
claim, both of which steps Veal resisted. Unlike Herrera, the previous steps in the chain 
of loan titles were not in issue, but rather whether the final transfer step really did give 
Wells standing to foreclose the mortgage. 
The problem arose because the assignment from Option One to Wells recited that it 
transferred “the mortgage securing payment of the note” without saying that it also 
transferred the note itself. Given that language, could Wells truly assert that if Veal paid 
it, Veal’s obligation on the note would be discharged as against any other creditor? Wells 
had to be a “person entitled to enforce” the instrument, as UCC Article 3 requires (UCC 
§3–301), but the documents did not show that Wells possessed the note or that the note 
was bearer paper, nor even that Wells was a possessing nonholder with the rights of a 
holder (such as one who takes by assignment rather than negotiation). Nor did it show 
that Wells was an owner of the note, with enforceable rights to payment of it under 
Article 9 (UCC §9–203). Transfer of a mortgage without the underlying note 
accomplishes nothing except to give the transferee a worthless piece of paper. As for 
AMHSI, its evidence failed to show that it was a proper agent of Wells, who held the 
note, or what endorsements were on it. 
Unlike Herrera, these are issues of commercial law rather than evidence. The lender or 
servicer has to have the note to enforce the mortgage debt; merely showing that it has the 
mortgage (without the note) is no substitute. Maybe Wells can find the note (it should 
have gotten possession of it under the pooling and servicing agreement that securitized 
the Option One pile of loans), or perhaps it can use appropriate lost note procedures to 
make up for its disappearance. The bankruptcy courts—as my prior columns have 
noted—are making considerably more rigorous demands than many of our state courts 
request. Veal is much closer to Herrera than to Aceves and Gomes in wanting all of the 
I’s dotted and T’s crossed. 
This case arose in Arizona and seemed to turn on Illinois law, but I think its logic might 
equally apply here—unless our state court holdings or statutes can trump federal 
bankruptcy rules. 
Edwards v Wells Fargo Bank: A Happy Ending? 
These three cases were conveniently published in an order that corresponds to the 
sequencing of foreclosure challenge issues, and this third decision takes us to the very 
end of the foreclosure process. In Edwards v Wells Fargo Bank (In re Edwards) (BAP 
9th Cir, July 12, 2011, BAP No. CC-10–1362-MkPaD) 2011 Bankr Lexis 2810, reported 
on p 167, a trustee sale was held on May 17. The lender (who purchased at that sale) filed 
an unlawful detainer action on June 3 and obtained judgment on July 14 and a writ of 
possession on July 26. Only after that, on August 5 (apparently in the hope of stopping 
execution of the writ), did the debtor file under Chapter 7. 
The bankruptcy filing was clearly too late, given that under CC §2924h, the debtor had 
much earlier lost all of her legal and equitable interests in the property. The completed 
trustee sale to itself meant that Wells was now full owner of the property. Therefore, 
according to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, (1) Wells had standing to request stay relief 
to continue seeking possession of the property and (2) the debtor no longer had any 
interest in the property to include in her bankruptcy estate. Earlier compliance with 
Veal’s demanding standards was no longer relevant, even in bankruptcy court. 
So there can come a time when everything finally does come to an end. But do not forget 
all that had to have happened to bring about that result. First, in her bankruptcy, this 
debtor wanted only to include the property in her estate—not, apparently, to challenge the 
mortgage loan, nor its transfer, nor its ultimate foreclosure. Second, in state court, she 
had defaulted in the unlawful detainer action brought against her. Even then, as the court 
notes in a footnote, res judicata does not necessarily mean complete issue preclusion 
against her, because of the brevity of summary unlawful detainer proceedings. So stay 
tuned for news on some later action yet to be brought by Edwards to undo everything. 
I was tempted to include a fourth, even later, post-foreclosure development from the 
federal district court, Herrera v LCS Fin. Serv. Corp. (ND Cal, June 1, 2011, No. C09–
02843 TEH) 2011 US Dist Lexis 58288 (not the same Herrera as in state court), which 
permitted class certification of the nearly 5000 homeowners who had received dunning 
notices from a loan servicer about their second mortgages, after having been foreclosed 
out of their first mortgages, probably in violation of the CCP §580b antideficiency rule, 
and arguably therefore in violation of the state and federal fair debt collection practices 
acts. So the saga does truly continue. 
 
